We present novel evidence that implicit causal inferences distort memory for events only seconds after viewing. Adults watched videos of someone launching (or throwing) an object. However, the videos omitted the moment of contact (or release). Subjects falsely reported seeing the moment of contact when it was implied by subsequent footage but did not do so when the contact was not implied. Causal implications were disrupted either by replacing the resulting flight of the ball with irrelevant video or by scrambling event segments. Subjects in the different causal implication conditions did not differ on false alarms for other moments of the event, nor did they differ in general recognition accuracy. These results suggest that as people perceive events, they generate rapid conceptual interpretations that can have a powerful effect on how events are remembered.
Introduction
We tend to think and talk about our experiences in terms of discrete events even though they occur over a continuous time line. We impose boundaries on streams of activity that reflect conceptual schemes for interpreting and representing event-related information. Imagine, for example, observing someone setting down a coffee mug, releasing it and pulling one's hand back. Even though the time line during which this process unfolds is necessarily continuous, we tend to mentally represent this continuity as three discrete events with clear boundaries. Here, we present novel evidence that causal inferences related to these ''event files'' can distort perceptual memory in a matter of seconds.
Different factors have been proposed as cues for determining when an event boundary will be created: degree of physical change (Newtson & Engquist, 1976) , intentionality cues (Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001 ) and prediction error (Avrahami & Kareev, 1994; Swallow, Zacks, & Abrams, 2009 ). More recent literature has focused on the downstream effects of segmenting events in these ways. For example, visual attention and memory have been shown to improve at event boundaries (Newtson & Engquist, 1976) , and recall for items from on-going events has been shown to be superior to memory from items in previous events, even after controlling for duration between exposure and test (Swallow et al., 2009) .
However, much less theoretical attention has been paid to the internal structure of token event representations. Given that the mind is constantly setting up new event representations on the fly, there should also be sophisticated compression routines in place for efficiently packaging previous events as they are being sent to memory. Rapid conceptual inferences may help parse previous events into causally coherent packages in ways that could systematically distort memory. Demonstrations of such an effect could also have implications for false memory effects at much longer time scales (e.g., Loftus & Palmer, 1974) .
One example of how disparate information can be made to cohere into a single representation comes from the literature on ''causal bridging inferences '' (Haviland & Clark, 1974) . Readers are faster to verify the sentence ''water extinguishes fire'' when they read the passage: Dorothy poured water on the bonfire. The bonfire went out compared
